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ABSTRACT
The ability to sustain indirect reciprocity is an example of collective
intelligence. It is increasingly relevant to future technology and
autonomous machines that need to function in a coalition.
Indirect reciprocity involves providing benefit to others without
guaranteeing a future return. The identity through which an agent
presents itself to others is fundamental, as this is how the
reputation of an agent is considered. In this paper, we examine
the sharing of identity between agents, which is an important and
frequently overlooked issue when considering indirect reciprocity.
We model an agent’s identity using traits, which can be shared
with other agents, and offer a basis for an agent to change their
identity. Through this approach, we determine how shared
identity affects cooperation, and the conditions through which
cooperation can be sustained. This also helps us to understand
how and why behavioural strategies involving identity function
are put in place, such as whitewashing. The framework offers the
opportunity to assess the interplay between the sharing of traits
and the cost, in terms of reduced cooperation and opportunities
for shirkers to benefit.
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Cooperation is a sophisticated form of collective intelligence where individuals become
incentivised to help one another and benefit from a coalition. One particularly interesting
but challenging form of cooperation is indirect reciprocity, which is complex because it
involves donating to a third party without any guarantee of future reciprocation.
Cooperation in this form involves a small cost to the donor, and a much larger benefit
to the recipient. This is a hallmark of human behaviour that leads to a societal benefit,
by providing a resource through which unrelated individuals support each other (Alexan-
der, 1987; Bear & Rand, 2016).
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Extensive research has been successful in establishing conditions and mechanisms that
promote indirect reciprocity. However, as machines are developed that feature cognition
and autonomy, interest in cooperation is reaching beyond humans (de Melo et al., 2019).
Transportation is just one emerging example where technology, through autonomous
vehicles, will encounter cooperative decision making (Imbsweiler et al., 2018). This scen-
ario features latent indirect reciprocity, such as when one driver allows another to
manoeuvre in traffic. Journeys in congestion often depend on this, such as when
exiting a T-junction, without which safe progress would be impossible in many cities.
Beyond technological scenarios, persistent human scenarios such as inter-group
conflict (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) continue to motivate the exploration of cooperation, and
the basis for it being sustained. The decision on whether or not to cooperate, when
called upon, is the fundamental issue. The personal identity is central to this – in human
terms personal identity represents the self-image that defines an individual and that is pro-
jected to others. This can be a function of traits and characteristics that are relevant to the
individual, including the different groups to which the individual belongs. Human group
identity can be either formed around immutable traits such as family, nationality, race, eth-
nicity, religion, or more temporal ones as a supported sport team, or even based on the
current working environment, friendship and familiarity links (Tajfel, 1974).
This opens up the possibility of components of identity being shared and may lead to
‘group mind’ behaviours like in-group favouritism and out-group bias (Swann & Buhrme-
ster, 2015). It is from identity that reputation is derived. Reputation provides a currency
through which cooperation can be recognized and signalled (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005),
allowing individuals to leverage future help when needed (Molleman et al., 2013).
Human group identity can become an important component of the extent to which the
reputation of an individual is formed and recognized independently form the personal
actions. In extreme situations, this can lead to the loss of any personal identity, where repu-
tation is fully merged with that of the group(s), leading to social phenomenons such as
stereotyping (Hales, 1998). In recent times reputation systems have also emerged to
support decision making in diverse areas of e-commerce. In auction systems, a seller’s
reputation proves fundamental in the willingness of buyers to decide whether or not to
place a bid (Melnik & Alm, 2002). Furthermore, e-commerce reputation also serves
beyond auction settings to signal the quality of product and services (Resnick et al.,
2000). This information has significant value as a ‘public good’ (Wasko & Faraj, 2000).
There are several other areas of work in multi-agent systems where the focus is to engineer
protocols or rules that seek to ensure cooperation is followed. These approaches aim to
disincentivize deviation from behaviours that benefit the public good (Wu et al., 2016).
The origins of reputation systems come frombehaviour in groupswith humans being adept
at using reputation to assess the integrity of others (Suzuki & Akiyama, 2005), as a means to
promote their survival. This allows groups to function, and humans are skilled at creating heur-
istics, or cognitive short cuts, that allow them to find potential cooperators without extensive
deliberation. However, these cognitive short cuts can also have negative implications. In the
context of driving dynamics, for example, the type of vehicle, its manufacturer, the age,
gender or other characteristics of the driver may well influence whether one driver helps
another. While this may appear insignificant, in the wider human context this behaviour can
have a major impact, being responsible for bias that fuels stereotyping (Galinsky & Moskowitz,
2000), resulting in potentially unwarranted discrimination and the spread of prejudice (Oakes &
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Turner, 1980). Divisive social consequences may result (Kawakami et al., 2017), leading to cat-
egorization, where the reputation that an individual incurs has no alignment to their actual
behaviour. This is a key component in theories concerning inter-group conflict. These issues
are also transferred to technological scenarios, depending on the capacity of machines to
align with human bias or foster it themselves (Whitaker et al., 2018).
1.1. Contribution
This work contributes to understanding how the sharing of identity impacts on cooperation.
This is achieved by modelling shared traits, that carry reputation in their own right from
which an individual’s reputation is derived based on the extent that particular traits rep-
resent their identity. The approach involves agent-based simulation, where agents have
some freedom in how they adapt their behaviour based on probabilistically copying the
strategy and possibly the traits of others, based on perceived success. This approach
allows us to explore conditions that either promote or impede cooperation. It should not
be confused with agent-based approaches in knowledge engineering, where protocols
are sought that allow cooperation to be enforced based on individual behaviour (e.g. Wu
et al., 2016). It can be noted that the vast majority of social-psychological treatments
related to identity and stereotyping assume a single unique trait per individual, despite
increasing demands to capture the ground truth of social organization (Bowleg, 2017).
Indirect reciprocity is the basis for our investigation, but other forms of cooperation
could also be applied. The approach is novel because models of indirect reciprocity con-
ventionally assume that each individual is represented by a unique reputation: in other
words, an individual’s behaviour is entirely identified and judged by their own actions.
Our model goes beyond this one-to-one mapping, allowing reputations to be implicitly
shared by different actors. In the context of cooperation, this means that individuals
become dependent on the donation behaviour of others for an element of their repu-
tation. Furthermore, our framework does not assume that ‘groups’ to which individuals
belong are mutually exclusive. Reputations are calculated on traits, any number of
which can be held by an individual. This better represents the fluidity that is seen in the
real world, where individuals are rarely totally defined by a single group affiliation and
group identity, but may be represented as a combination of characteristics and affiliations.
We examine how both repeated sharing of the same trait and across multiple traits
affects the emergence of cooperation. This represents a general scenario where traits
are fixed and persistent (i.e. the agent cannot change traits). In contrast, we also
examine how the ability to change traits and pursue the traits of those deemed most suc-
cessful, affects cooperation. This is an evolutionary form of ‘whitewashing’, where identity
becomes a strategic component that is mutable in pursuit of payoff. These results help us
to understand how the structure of traits and the freedom of agents in changing them
affects cooperation through indirect reciprocity. This extends our work on stereotyping
and contributions to previously limited insights in this direction.
2. Key related literature
This research focuses on indirect reciprocity, groups and the role of reputation. Indirect
reciprocity is frequently considered in the context of the donation game, where an
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agent has to make a decision on whether or not to provide a donation. This results in a cost
c to the donor, and a benefit b to the recipient, and necessarily c<b (Brandt et al., 2007;
Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). Reputation systems act to signal an agent’s overall donation
behaviour to the wider population. Because other agents may use an agent’s reputation
in deciding when or not to donate, there is an incentive for all potential recipients to main-
tain reputation at a sufficient level to yield future donations (Fehr, 2004; Milinski et al.,
2002; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000).
Critical within reputation systems are assessment rules. These are the criteria by which a
donor’s reputation is adjusted in light of their actions, and therefore govern the extent of
reward over penalty. In this sense, they have been considered as a model for morality
(Alexander, 1987). Three main alternatives for assessment of cooperative action are
image scoring, standing and judging. Sugden (1986) first developed standing, which was
originally conceived for binary reputations. This assessment rule effectively classifies
each individual in the population as either good or bad, penalizing the good if they
donate to the bad.
Image scoring (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000) presented the first
significant alternative, where reputation is simply incremented or decremented in
response to donation or defection respectively. A limitation of image scoring is that
those who choose not to cooperate with defectors may be unfairly labelled as less coop-
erative (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003). Consequently, with
their roots in the work of (Sugden, 1986), standing (Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003) and
judging (Brandt & Sigmund, 2004) have emerged as the alternatives that capture ‘legiti-
mate shirking’ (Fishman, 2003; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Rand & Nowak, 2013). These dis-
crimination rules have mainly been studied assuming that reputation has a binary
representation (Brandt et al., 2007; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2006), although this was generalized
for standing in Whitaker et al. (2016).
The overwhelming convention is that individuals hold their own individual reputation
with similarity of reputation only introduced to address uncertainty (e.g. Leimar & Ham-
merstein, 2001; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998). Deviation from this has occurred in the biologi-
cal literature, specifically concerning the plausibility of group selection such as in Wilson
(1975) and Smith (1964). These models assume that individuals belong to precisely one
group, and it is the group entity that determines whether or not individuals propagate
to future generations. This was largely dismissed by the biological literature but was
revisited when the idea of multi-level selection was proposed by Wilson and Sober
(1994), where individual and group identity coexist and may promote cooperation
(Nowak et al., 2010). Reputation systems can feature in this context, allowing individuals
to potentially switch between individual and group reputations (Masuda, 2012; Suzuki &
Akiyama, 2005). However, this remains a controversial theory, as discussed by Pinker
(2012).
Psychological processes of categorization are well seen in human behaviour, and work
relating to groups and cooperation has featured consideration of both in-group bias
(Fu et al., 2012; Hammond & Axelrod, 2006) and out-group prejudice (Brewer, 1999;
Whitaker et al., 2018), while not necessarily invoking the use of a group reputation.
These contributions reflect the disposition of individuals to differentiate, either implicitly
or explicitly, based on their strong identification with self-similar individuals (Launay &
Dunbar, 2015). Stereotyping is a related extension of this, where third party individuals
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are categorized together through a perception of common identity (Galinsky & Moskowitz,
2000). This is well known to be a divisive phenomenon in the human world (Dovidio et al.,
1998; Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner et al., 1987).
In the case of reputation systems, only a few contributions consider categorization. In
Baranski et al. (2006) the impact of group reputation is considered through multi-agents.
Here, the concept of group reputation is shared by all individuals within a group when
they interact with out-group members. This is calculated as the average of all individual
reputations in a group and assumes that group reputation is an aggregation of the behav-
iour of individuals. Similarly in Masuda (2012), a group structure is proposed where indi-
viduals interact within their groups using a personal reputation. When they play out-
group, individuals adopt a group-level reputation. This model also assumes that reputation
is binary. These models do not allow for individuals to share subsets of traits, or aspects of
their identity, and depend on individuals belonging to a single group. Our approach is to
allow individuals to have a more complex composition of their identity, based on the
assessment of multiple traits against which reputations are maintained.
Trait and set membership have also received attention as simple signalling mechanisms
to promote the evolution of cooperation. Without the use of reputation, these elements
have been regarded as abstract tags that are sufficient to incentivise some level of
cooperation, which is known as the green beard effect (Nowak, 2006; Riolo et al., 2001).
The evolution of set theory shows that more complex set structures can promote the
emergence of cooperation even in absence of other incentives (Hamilton, 1964; Lieber-
man et al., 2005; Nowak & May, 1992). Tarnita et al. (2009) proposed a model based on
the evolution of sets where the degree of shared membership is based on the overlapping
of sets of multiple traits. In this model, the interaction is limited to traits that they have in
common with others. An individual’s strategy and set membership updates under evol-
utionary settings. However, individuals only have one strategy which is to cooperate or
defect. Moderate levels of cooperation can be sustained with a limited mutation on
traits (Nathanson et al., 2009; Tarnita et al., 2011). Similarly, Li et al. (2016) adopted the
same model to study evolutionary dynamics of minimum-effort coordination games in
structured populations.
In Gao et al. (2018), the authors describe a model in which individuals are in groups and
interactions may occur between in-group members and across groups. The model does
not allow for individuals to have membership in more than one group. Individuals have
two strategies that enable them to act differently towards in-group and out-group
members. Although their model does not rely on reputation, it allows for mutation
during the reproduction phase. Mutation, in this case, occurs on traits and strategies.
Their model is adapted from a simplified prisoner’s dilemma.
The option to change identity leads to opportunities for agents to gain an advantage.
Whitewashing is a term that has been used to describe the action of agents who change
their identities in order to avoid punishment from other agents (Feldman & Chuang,
2005a). The term has been mostly used to describe this action within peer-to-peer repu-
tation systems where users have been able to replace their pseudonyms to escape from
any punishment due to their bad reputation. Whitewashing or re-entry attacks enable free-
riders to restore their reputation to gain some short-term payoff, (Hoffman et al., 2009). Only
limited research has studied the subject within an evolutionary perspective to gather an
understanding of whitewashing in cooperative situations (Feldman & Chuang, 2005b).
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Whitewashing reduces the opportunity for agents to accumulate a bad reputation and
opens up opportunities for defection as a consequence.
3. Model
The simulation model that is introduced pays attention to the structure of reputation that
agents hold when engaged in a cooperative dilemma (indirect reciprocity). Rather than
individuals holding their own unique reputation, or being identified by a single group
membership, the concept of traits is used to represent how individuals may be perceived
as belonging to groups and present a personal identity as a consequence. Traits are fea-
tures that are held by agents and represent identifiable characteristics. All agents have at
least one trait, and each trait may belong to one or more agents. Unless otherwise
specified by the experiment, the traits are assumed to be immutable.
Rather than reputation being associated with individual agents or mutually exclusive
groups, it is assumed that each trait t [ T has associated with it a reputation rt , and an
agent i derives its personal reputation ri from the reputations of the traits associated
with i. Specifically, let Ti (with |Ti| . 0) denote the associated set of traits for agent i,





In other words, an agent’s reputation is the average of the reputation of its associated
traits. Consequently, any individual element of reputation relies exclusively on an agent
being the only one to hold a certain trait.
This arrangement allows identity to be considered: traits belonging to an agent and
shared by others are components of personal identity and are used as a proxy for their
individual reputation. Furthermore, traits do not necessarily partition agents into mutually
exclusive sets or groups, providing a useful generalization. This approach is applied using
cooperation in the form of indirect reciprocity.
3.1. Indirect reciprocity
The donation game is adopted, which is a subclass of the mutual aid game (Sugden, 1986)
where the donor incurs a cost with no guarantee of reciprocation from the beneficiary, or
any other individual. This is modelled through prosocial donations which result in a cost c
to the donor agent and a benefit b to the recipient, where b>c>0. There are wide-ranging
models for indirect reciprocity (e.g. Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998;
Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2006; Takahashi & Mashima, 2006), however, this work uses the recent
and remarkably simple approach of social comparison of reputation proposed in Whitaker
et al. (2016). This follows the human disposition to make relative judgments about the
standing of others.
Each agent i carries a binary vector of variables (si , ui , di) which represents i’s current
action rule with respect to i’s donation behaviour when it is called upon to consider
making a donation to another agent j. The action rule indicates whether or not i
donates when similarity (si), upward (ui), or downward self-comparison (di) is observed
by i in respect of j’s reputation (rj), as compared to i’s own reputation value (ri). Similarity
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in self-comparison is identified when rj = ri , upward self-comparison occurs when rj . ri ,
and downward self-comparison occurs when rj , ri.
Periodically each agent updates its action rule through social learning, as a conse-
quence of observing others in the population. Similarly, each agent may update its trait
to reflect this observation. It is known (Whitaker et al., 2016) that evolution promotes
the action rule (1, 1, 0), allowing agents to discriminate against those having a lower repu-
tation than themselves, thereby representing a relative threat.
3.2. Updating reputation
Every time an agent i is called to play the donation game with a potential recipient j, i’s
donation decision depends on the agent’s action rule, and the reputation of traits associ-
ated with are updated as a consequence of the outcome. The concept of standing is used.
If i donates, then rt is incremented, for all t [ Ti . If rj ≥ ri and i defects then the reputation
of trait t, rt is decremented, for all t [ Ti . This means that an individual’s actions equally
affect the traits by which it is represented. Note that the updating approach ensures
that a reduction in reputations does not occur when i fails to donate and j is of a lesser
reputation, providing a defense against shirkers. Each trait’s reputation is capped and
allowed to vary in the integer range [−5, 5].
3.3. Performing the game
The donation game is performed on a set of agents A representing a population of indi-
viduals, in this case |A| = 100. Each agent i has four key fundamental attributes: its set of
traits Ti , its action rule (si , ui , di), its reputation ri and its fitness fi . Fitness represents the
economic payoff as the accumulation of costs and benefits that are paid and received
by i over the current generation. A generation involves making 5000 random selections
of a potential recipient j, from the population, to play the donation game. Let
Nj = {x [ A− {j}:Tj > Tx = ∅} be the set of agents that share at least one trait with
agent j and Nj = {x [ A− {j}:Tj > Tx = ∅}. The potential donor i is selected at random
from the set Nj with probability s and from the set Nj with probability 1-s. If no suitable
donors are found then i is randomly selected from A-{j}.
For an agent j, the potential donor agent i is selected from the sub-population having at
least one trait from Tj , with probability s. Here s is a global parameter (not to be confused
with si) that governs the extent to which an agent is disposed to playing in-group (i.e. with
similar others).
At the end of a generation, reproduction occurs. This can be thought of as social learn-
ing where agents probabilistically copy the action rules of others, taking into account the
success of other agents based on their fitness. Specifically, each agent i in the population
copies the action rule of another agent j randomly, weighted by fj/
∑n
k=1 fk (i.e. roulette
wheel), upon which i adopts j’s action rule for the next generation.
At this point, mutation is applied to each element of an action rule with probability
1/100. Prior to commencing a new generation, fitness fi is set to zero (fi = 0, ∀i) and
for all traits t, rt = 0 is set. Throughout a c/b ratio of 0.7 is applied. 100,000 gener-
ations are performed and the simulation is principally evaluated by comparing the
total number of instances of cooperation (i.e. i donating to j in a donation game)
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across all generations. Average figures of cooperation over five randomly seeded runs
are used.
To explore the effects of freedom in changing identity, we also perform experiments
where agents are additionally able to copy traits, as well as the action rule, of others, prob-
abilistically based on payoff. This allows an agents identity to evolve, influenced by the
success of others. Similarly, in this scenario, mutation on each trait is selected with a
probability of 1/100 after each cycle of reproduction. The pseudo code is summarized
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Performing the game
Set of Agents A; Set of traits T; cost C; benefit B
Generate initial population of agents
Assign set of traits Ti to each agent i, as defined by the experiment
Assign (si,ui,di) randomly from the eight possible instances
# Perform evolutionary simulation
for number of generations M = 100000 do
Set fi = 0 ∀i∈A and rt = 0 ∀t∈T
for number of iterations m = 5000 do
# Selection
Select recipient j∈A at random;
Let p ←U(0,1)
if p < s |Nj| > 0 then
Select donor i at random from Nj
else if p≥s |N̄j|>0 then
Select donor i at random from |N̄j|
else
Select donor i at random from A-{ j}
end if
# Action Rules
if (ri=rj and si=1) or (r
i>rj and ui=1) or (r
i<rj and di=1) then
i donates
rt ← min(5, rt+1);









Generate new population proportionally to the individual payoff
Apply mutation to each agent in the new population
end for
4. Experiments
The model allows different types of reputation sharing with other agents based on the trait
(s) that are held in common. We say that an agent is dependent if it shares at least one trait
with another agent. Otherwise, the agent is independent. Furthermore, if an agent i is such
that |Ti| . 1 then i is a multi-trait agent. Otherwise, i is a single-trait agent.
We consider three ways in which the structure of shared identity can be composed. In
Section 4.1 we consider the effect of dependent single-trait agents on the evolution of
cooperation, assuming that each agent’s traits remain fixed throughout. In Section 4.2
we consider the effect of a dependent multi-trait agent on the evolution of cooperation,
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again assuming that each agent’s traits remain fixed throughout. Finally, in Section 4.3, we
allow agents to probabilistically change their traits at the reproduction stage, based on
payoff.
4.1. Dependent single-trait identities
We consider the effects of a single common trait being shared by a set of single-trait
agents. Let G1 be the set of all agents i having Ti = {1}. An example schema for this
arrangement of traits is shown in Figure 1(a). We experiment to determine the
maximum size of G1 through which cooperation can be sustained. Note that if all
agents are single-trait and independent, their reputation is based entirely on their own
past interactions and the results in Whitaker et al. (2016) are replicated. At the other
extreme, if all agents are dependent and share a single trait, then agents are (almost)
entirely judged on the actions of others, and a greater incentive to defect can be expected.
The results of increasing the size of G1 is shown in Figure 2(a), alongside varying s, the
probability that agent’s play with those having at least one trait in common.
Two patterns emerge: firstly cooperation declines rapidly when at least 15 dependent
single-trait agents share a common trait. Secondly, the average cooperation declines as s
increases.
Dependent single-trait agents lack a distinguishable personal reputation, which means
that the reputational benefit of donation is shared with others while the cost is borne by
the individual. This stereotyping effect provides an opportunity for defective strategies to
take hold, where free riders can benefit from enjoying a shared reputation without donat-
ing. However, this cannot be sustained at scale, leading to the global collapse of
cooperation. As the reputation of a shared trait increases, there is greater opportunity
for exploitation by free riders.
Figure 3 shows the action rules (defection strategy (0, 0, 0) and discrimination strategy
(1, 1, 0)) that occur across the populations considered as subsequent generations occur,
with |G1| = 10. This is presented for three different values of s (0, 0.5, 1). The discrimination
strategy dominates when all agents carry their own unique reputation as in Whitaker et al.
(2016). Prioritizing interaction with those who share the same trait (i.e. high s) accelerates
Figure 1. Alternative agent-trait relationships for single-trait and multi-trait agents. (a) |G1|=4 single-
trait dependent agents who share trait 1. (b) One multi-trait dependent agent, and five single-trait
dependent agents.
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the collapse of cooperation further as the discriminative strategy directs donations
towards agents with a similar reputation. When s is low, dependent single-trait agents
interact mainly with those who don’t share their reputation as they are still incentivised
to adopt cooperative strategies to maximize their fitness with a reduced risk of
exploitation.
4.2. Dependent multi-trait identities
In this section, we consider the effects of introducing a single dependent multi-trait agent
(agent 1) in a population of single-trait agents. The schema for this arrangement is shown
in Figure 1(b) and we vary |T1|. The results (Figure 2(b)) show that as the number of traits
held by agent 1 increases (i.e. |T1|), cooperation diminishes. This occurs similarly whether
or not agent 1 plays with those who have at least one trait in common, as governed by s.
The sharing agent 1’s reputation is dispersed across single-trait agents that between
Figure 2. Figure (a) shows the relationship between cooperation, parameter s, and the size of the set G1
of agents sharing a common trait (see Figure 1(a)). Figure (b) shows the effect of increasing the size of
the set of traits T1 of a single multi-trait agent on cooperation, in a scenario where all other agents are
single trait (see Figure 1(b)). (a) Dependent single-trait agents. (b) Dependent multi-trait agent.
Figure 3. Distribution of action rules (0, 0, 0) and (1, 1, 0) by generation for the sets of single-trait
dependent agents G1 and independent agents A − G1. |G1| = 10 and s=0 (left), 0.5 (middle), and 1
(right).
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themselves have no trait in common. This helps to suppress the rise of defective action
rules, as compared to the previous scenario (Section 4.1). In fact, |T1| can reach a consider-
able size (e.g. 30–35 traits) before which cooperation starts to significantly diminish.
In this scenario, single-trait dependent agents rely entirely on themselves and the multi-
trait agent for their reputation. Each single-trait dependent agent can also free ride on the
single multi-trait agent, and this opens the opportunity for defection to establish itself,
although to a lesser extent than the case presented in Section 4.1. When the number of
traits of the multi-trait agent is relatively small, the presence of free-riding dependent
single-trait agents can be sustained without too much disruption to the reputation of
the multi-trait agent. As |T1| increases, and the number of dependent single-trait agents
increases, there is a greater opportunity for free-riding action rules to take hold (e.g.
Hi = (0, 0, 0)). At the same time, there are fewer independent single-trait agents available
in the population. This promotes the collapse of cooperation. As soon as a defective strat-
egy takes hold across the population, it then opens the opportunity for this to spread to
other agents. Interestingly, s has relatively little impact on whether dependent agents
prioritize playing with those that have a common trait. However, they are less likely to
have an equal reputation in this instance.
Finally, we experiment with adding a secondmulti-trait agent, by replacing a single-trait
agent (agent number 2) in Figure 1(b), where T2 # T1. Figure 4 shows the effect of varying
|T2 > T1|, that is the extent to which T2 has the same traits as T1. These results show that
high proportions of shared identity through multi-trait agents undermine the reputation
system. Because the second multi-trait agent can hold a large subset of the first agent’s
traits, it can heavily disrupt the first agent’s reputation, by using defection as its action
rule. This effect is more pronounced than that of a dependent single-trait agent sharing
reputation with the multi-trait dependent agent, and increases as |T2 > T1| increases.
4.3. The evolution of identity
The previous experiments considered the evolution of behavioural action rules (strategies)
while traits remained fixed throughout. In this section, we consider the effects of also
Figure 4. The figures show the relationship between agents and traits for two dependent multi-trait
agents (left) and the average cooperation produced as a function of the size of the intersection
between the sets belonging to agents one and two for different values of |T1| where s=0 (right).
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allowing agents to update their identity by changing their trait during the reproduction
phase. To explore this scenario, we assume that each agent i has only a single trait
(|Ti| = 1), however, agents are able to share (and copy) the trait of another. The probability
of an agent i changing to the identity of another agent j is proportional to j’s payoff relative
to the whole population at the end of a generation. We further apply a mutation rate to the
trait held by i to change into any other trait t [ T − {ti}. Mutation of traits allows for strat-
egies to arise in the population even when they have been removed through evolution. A
trait mutation rate of 10% is applied, unless otherwise stated.
We experimented with a scenario where each individual initially has a single unique
trait (referred to as ‘independent agents’). However, because individuals are allowed to
move between traits to promote payoff at the end of each generation, scenarios with
different starting configurations have similar outcomes. The results in Figure 5(a) indicate
that for the lowest values of s only limited cooperation is achieved, while it increases with
higher rates of in-group interactions. Cooperation achieves an average of above 70%
when individuals only interact with those having the same trait (s=1). When s=0
cooperation never reaches a level above 10% on average over 100, 000 generations.
This is in contrast with the outcomes obtained where identity remained fixed throughout
the simulation, for which increasing the proportion of in-group interactions produced a
sharp decrease in cooperative behaviour, see Figure 1.
When s=1, interactions of dependent agents are limited to agents who share their
trait. Figure 6(b) shows that a trait can be shared between 10 and 30 agents before
cooperation collapses, which is in line with previous experimentation (Figure 2(a))
where cooperation cannot be sustained when several agents share the same trait. The
struggle for domination between the cooperators and defectors is seen in Figure 7(b).
Here cooperative agents establish themselves with common identities and are then dis-
rupted by defectors who adopt the same identity before they mutate to a new trait. This
cycle repeats throughout the simulation (Figure 8(b)) and results in an average of above
70% cooperation. As evolution progresses shared traits increasingly tend to identify with
cooperators (see Figure 6(a)).
Figure 5. The figures show the relationship between parameter s and cooperation when mutation on
traits is applied at a rate of 10%. (a) Shows the relationship between cooperation and parameter s when
the evolution of identity is enabled alongside the evolution of action rules. (b) Shows the relationship
between parameter s and cooperation when agents are only allowed to evolve their identities but not
their action rules.
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In this scenario (s=1), the reputation system becomes redundant because dependent
agents only interact with those that have the same trait, and therefore the same repu-
tation. This simplifies an agent’s behaviour which becomes entirely dependent on si (ui
and di no longer function because all agents have the same reputation): simply i
cooperates if si = 1, otherwise it defects. The set of interacting cooperators sharing the
same trait maximize payoff and, as a result, attract other agents, increasing their
number as long as their group doesn’t involve defectors (i.e. agents i with si = 0) that
can benefit from shared reputation without donating. This provides opportunities for
defective strategies to take hold and cooperation collapses. In this context, trait mutation
allows cooperators to escape from defectors and move to an alternative trait. Figure 9
shows the criticality of mutation. When mutation is zero, agents are unable to escape
from defectors. When the mutation rate is modestly increased (e.g. 1%), cooperative
agents are able to change traits and rebuild a network of cooperative peers. However,
when the mutation rate increases significantly, mutation impedes cooperation because
Figure 7. Distribution of strategies over generations when both strategies and identities are inherited.
(a) When s=0 the most frequent strategy within the population is the defector (0, 0, 0). This explains
the lack of cooperation within the population that is displayed in Figure 8(a). (b) In contrast, when s=1,
there is no clear dominant strategy within the population as it alternates between cooperators (si = 1)
and defectors (si = 0) throughout the different generations.
Figure 6. The frequency of agents that share a trait over generations when evolving both action rules
and identity and s=1. (a) The frequency of strategies used by agents who are sharing traits at fixed
generations (10 to 100, 000). The figure shows that there are mostly cooperators than defectors
within the most shared traits. (b) The most shared traits within each generation (where each
different trait is represented by colour). The figure shows that a trait can be shared between 10 and
30 agents before cooperation collapses.
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agents are rapidly mixing, increasing the chances of defectors and cooperators to share a
trait (e.g. mutation of 100% is pure chance). This mechanism underlies the results in Figure
6, which shows how traits are shared by agents, with a few traits achieving a large amount
of sharing by cooperators. These results align with the conclusions of Fu et al. (2012) and
Tarnita et al. (2009), where a limited rate of trait mutation allows cooperators to rebuild,
albeit improving on the levels of cooperation achieved. Similar techniques aimed to
desert defectors as a mean to promote cooperation in absence of reputation, punishment,
or other ostracizing mechanisms have also had relevance in the literature, see Aktipis
(2004).
We note that this phenomenon only occurs when s=1, and allows for cooperation to be
sustained in the presence of defectors. A similar behaviour is observed for high pro-
portions of in-group interaction. In contrast, with high proportions of interaction
outside the shared group (s=0) and the reputation system fully in place, the same stereo-
typing effect described in Section 4.1 occurs, and cooperators do not establish themselves
Figure 8. The pattern of cooperation over 100, 000 generations for s=0 and s=1 when evolving both
identity and action rules. (a) Cooperation has a fluctuating trend throughout the 100, 000 generations
when s=0 producing a cooperation with an average below 10%. (b) Cooperation has a fluctuating trend
throughout the 100, 000 generations when s=1 producing a cooperation with an average above 70%.
Figure 9. Cooperation vs. mutation rate for different values of s. The application of mutation on traits
affects cooperation when s=1 depending on the mutation rate applied. However, when s = 0 mutation
has a lower effect.
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without exploitation as the groups sharing identity become increasingly large. This pro-
duces fluctuating cycles around lower cooperative levels (Figure 8(a)) leading to a substan-
tial reduction in the average cooperation even in the presence of trait mutation, see
Figure 9.
4.3.1. Evolving identity rather than action rules
In this section we allow agents to evolve their identity while assuming that their action
rules remain fixed throughout. In all other respects, we retain the parameter settings
used in Section 4.3.
In these circumstances, the parameter s has a low impact on cooperation, as shown in
Figure 5(b), where modest levels of cooperation are sustained (around 45–50%). As agents
move towards interacting only with other agents who share the same trait, cooperation
increases slightly. Changing identity does not offer protection against those holding defec-
tive strategies, as success equally attracts both defectors and cooperators to change iden-
tity. Accordingly, when a trait is associated with a healthy payoff, there is a likelihood of
this being undermined by defectors in subsequent generations (Figure 10(a)) albeit with
less fluctuation than when action rules are not fixed (Figure 8(b)).
5. Discussion and conclusion
In this work, we have addressed the issue of identity in cooperation systems, specifically
concerning indirect reciprocity. Through a trait-based model, where traits hold reputation
in their own right and can be shared between individuals, we allow reputation to be
shared and combined. This challenges the current default assumption in modelling
cooperation systems, which typically involves a one-to-one mapping between agents
and their reputation. The results have established that cooperation can be heavily dis-
rupted by the sharing of identity, when conditions allow for defective strategies to propa-
gate through identity sharing. We note that our model does not involve any secondary
mechanisms aligned to group-based social norms (i.e. human kinship), which may function
Figure 10. Evolving identity rather than action rules. (a) When evolving identity without action rules
cooperation presents small fluctuations throughout the 100, 000 generations producing an average of
50%, when s=1. (b) The most frequent strategies used within shared traits at specific generations
(10–100, 000) with s = 1.
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to promote cooperation in a particular group without reputation and where there is a
common identity, as in generalized reciprocity.
In our general scenario, stereotyping takes place where common traits are used as
proxy an individuals identity and their reputation. This introduces the opportunity for
agents to disconnect their actions from their reputation. Through this mechanism,
agents can deploy defective strategies: that is an agent can avoid paying the full costs
of donations, but still receive them based on the reputation aligned with its associated
traits. How identity is shared, through inheritance of traits, is highly influential. Holding
multiple traits presents an opportunity for agents to share a limited proportion of their
identity with others. In doing so they have the potential to better control their exposure
to defectors.
Single-trait and multi-trait agents are differentiated in how they share traits with others.
Under uniform conditions, single-trait agents have a reduced chance of having a trait in
common. However, when another agent shares their trait, their reputation becomes sus-
ceptible to the actions of a third party. In contrast, for multi-trait agents, increasing the
number of traits can give them a chance to retain an element of unique personal identity,
through traits that aren’t shared with others. Moreover, for multi-trait agents, sharing can
occur with a number of agents that have no dependency between them, in terms of
common traits. The results show that reasonable levels of cooperation can be sustained
while there is a modest level of sharing of identity in the population, after which
cooperation collapses.
We have also examined the consequences of identity change becoming an element of
an agent’s strategy. This extends the concept of whitewashing, allowing agents to legiti-
mately share traits with those that are successful. The results show that this can be dama-
ging to the emergence of cooperation. However, when conditions are imposed that
dictate agents should primarily play with those having the same trait in common, signifi-
cant cooperation emerges. We have found that this creates an interesting set of conditions
where the reputation system collapses, the agents are divided into mutually exclusive sets
that are identified by traits, and donation decisions are made on a single component of an
agent’s action rule (si). In these circumstances, the presence of a modest amount of trait
mutation is sufficient to allow cooperation to emerge. The results indicate bursty-ness
in cooperation as evolution takes place, due to payoff through cooperators with a
common trait being subsequently undermined by the presence of agents with defective
strategies. This finding is significant because it shows how a reputation-based cooperation
systems collapses into set-based evolution (Fu et al., 2012; Tarnita et al., 2009), which
bridges alternative perspectives on evolution other than indirect reciprocity (i.e. general-
ized reciprocity, see Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000).
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